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Abstract 
Sebelum terjadinya serangan 9/11, hubungan militer antara Amerika Serikat dan 
Indonesia bernuansa konfrontasi ketimbang kerjasama karena penerapan embargo 
pelatihan militer dan transfer persenjataan oleh Amerika Serikat pasca tragedi Santa 
Cruz pada tahun 1991. Meski demikian, sepanjang tahun 2003 dan 2004, ketika 
Indonesia masih dalam masa embargo, pemerintah AS dilaporkan telah mendukung 
pembentukan pasukan elit di Indonesia bernama Detasemen Khusus 88 Anti-Teror 
yang juga dikenal sebagai Densus 88. Serangan 9/11 dan beberapa aktivitas terorisme 
di seluruh dunia setelahnya membuat pemerintah AS berada pada situasi krisis. 
Berdasarkan bukti-bukti yang ada, penulis menyimpulkan bahwa di bawah situasi krisis 
pemerintah AS sangat mungkin untuk melanggar garis kebijakan luar negerinya sendiri 
seperti yang ditunjukkan dengan dukungannya terhadap Densus 88 di Indonesia. 
Before 9/11 attack, U.S. and Indonesia military relation was under the shade of 
confrontation rather than cooperation since the imposing of U.S. embargo on military 
training and weaponry transfer after Santa Cruz tragedy in 1991. However, throughout 
2003 and 2004, when Indonesia was still in the embargo, U.S. government reportedly 
supported the establishment of an elite force in Indonesia named Special Detachment 
88 Anti-Terror which also known as Densus 88. 9/11 attack and many terrorism 
activities throughout the world in its aftermath were situating U.S. government under 
crisis situation. Based on existed evidences, the author concludes that under crisis 
situation, U.S. government is highly possible violating its own foreign policy line as 
indicated with its support to Densus 88 in Indonesia. 
Keywords: war on terrorism; crisis situation; national security; crisis behavior 
From Enemy Becoming Ally 
“America under Attack,” that was the theme of CNN broadcasting on 
September 11th 2001. CNN reported all development the aftermath of terrorist 
attack in 24 hours and put the title “America under Attack” under the TV 
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screen. In that day, U.S. experienced the most terrible attack to its mainland 
since the Second World War, called as 9/11 (nine eleven) attack. Nineteen 
terrorists’ whose affiliation to terrorist group in Afghanistan named Al Qaeda 
were accused behind the scenario and they must be responsible to this attack.1 
As the result of 9/11 attack, President of the United States, George W. 
Bush, declared that America was in war. But the war that had been declared 
was the unconventional war towards the unclear and unseen enemy never 
discussed before in the international law. This new kind of war was called ‘the 
war on terrorism’ with the main target Al Qaeda as the organization 
responsible for 9/ 11 attack as well as all people, organization and government 
that harbor and support Al Qaeda’s members. 
Bush asserted that the top priority of his administration would be a 
campaign to end terrorism. All governments around the world had to decide 
whether they stand with U.S. in its antiterrorist effort or they face its wrath. 
Bush stated: 
“Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are 
with us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that 
continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United 
States as a hostile regime.”
2
 
There was an interesting situation when the first head of government 
visited America after 9/11 attack was President Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
President of the Republic of Indonesia. One week after 9/11 tragedy, on 
September 17th 2001, President of the most populous Moslem country in the 
world visited the White House, gave the condolence and delivered a clear 
message that Indonesia was together with U.S. government in the war on 
terrorism. Megawati was not influenced by President Bush statement some 
hours after 9/11 attack when he preferred the term of ‘crusade’ to label ‘the 
war on terrorism’ which, of course, resurrected the history of conflicting 
situation between Western and Moslem civilization. 
Indonesian government was totally involved with U.S. coalition in the war 
against terrorism after Bali Blast tragedy. On October 12th 2002, members of 
Jemaah Islamiyah, a terrorist organization whose cells in countries across 
Southeast Asia and believed to receive support from Al Qaeda, detonated a 
truck bomb outside a nightclub on Indonesian island of Bali. The explosion 
killed nearly 200 people and injured 300 more. The greatest numbers killed in 
the bombing, however, were Australians.3 Series of bombings were also 
situated after Bali Blast, such as Marriot Hotel blast in Jakarta 2003 and the 
Australian Embassy bombing 2004.  
Bali Blast and other bombings throughout Indonesia had convinced 
Megawati’s administration to declare the war on terrorism. Finally, Megawati 
found the best time to issue Executive Order no. 1/ 2002 on Fight against 
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Terrorism as Criminal Activity. This regulation was ratified by Indonesian 
Parliament and became Indonesian Anti-Terrorism Law on April 4th 2003 
under title ‘the Republic of Indonesia Law no. 15/ 2003 on Fight Against 
Terrorism as Criminal Activity’. 
In order to support the war on terrorism in Indonesia, on Thursday, 
August 17th 2004, The Jakarta Police unveiled a special new squad tasked to 
help protect the capital city from terrorist attacks named ‘Anti-Terror 
Detachment 88’ and called as Densus 88. The Singapore newspaper, The 
Straits Times, reported that Densus 88 was an elite Indonesian police counter-
terrorism force being established in courtesy of American expertise and 
money. Anti-Terror Detachment 88, known as Densus 88, was sponsored by 
Washington’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) initiative. Washington agreed to 
give US$12 million towards their training. Mr. Gary Laing, an ATA program 
manager, said that U.S. government was also supplying the elite unit with top-
of-the-line weaponry and communications equipment. Gluck-17 handguns, AR-
10 sniper rifles and Remington 870 shotguns join the M4 sub-machine guns to 
complement 88's arsenal.4 
According to U.S. Department of State, throughout 2003, Indonesian 
police officers received training in both investigative and response techniques 
to enhance their capabilities to combat terrorism. On July 2003, 30 Indonesian 
National Police officers completed an intense 15-week counter-terrorism 
investigation course sponsored by ATA. On October 2003, 24 officers 
graduated from the Crisis Response (SWT) course and 15 from the Explosive 
Incident Countermeasure course. Indonesian officer-students enrolled in the 
three classes attended a state-of-the-art training school approximately 30 
miles south of Jakarta, which was equipped with ATA-funded “shot house” for 
simulating hostage situations, a number of rages and other facilities. 
Graduates of these courses became the core members of the first national-
level Indonesian National Police counterterrorism special detachment. This 
group was designated as “Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror.” The number 
“88,” culturally a double lucky number in Indonesia, also represents a phonetic 
approximation of “ATA”.5 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program was a cooperative effort of U.S. 
Department of State with foreign law enforcement officials. It had trained over 
36,000 foreign police and security forces from 142 countries around the world 
in measures designed to combat, deter, and solve terrorist crimes. Congress 
authorized ATA program in 1983 as part of a major initiative against 
international terrorism.6 Countries joining ATA Program should fulfill some 
requirements, including human rights consideration. According to Chapter 8 of 
Part 2 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Section 573 (b), it requires 
consultation of the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights 
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and Labor when choosing countries who will receive ATA assistance, and when 
determining the nature of the assistance to be provided.7 
Though human rights consideration was a part of requirements for 
countries that might join ATA program, Densus 88 could receive numerous 
amounts of money, training and weaponry equipment through ATA program. 
This situation was questionable because Indonesia was formally still in U.S. 
military training and weaponry embargo due to human rights concern. U.S. 
Congress shut close Indonesia’s International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) aid on October 1992. The legislation became law as part of the Fiscal 
Year 1993 (FY1993) Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and was re-enacted 
in FY1994 and FY1995.8 On July 1993, the State Department, under 
congressional pressure, applied the weaponry banning by blocking a transfer 
of U.S. F-5 fighter planes from the Jordan to Indonesia, citing human rights 
concerns. In the beginning of 1994, the State Department banned the sale of 
small arms and riot control equipment to Indonesia. While in the 1995 and 
1996, they expanded the ban to include helicopter-mounted equipment and 
armored personnel carriers.9 This embargo was still applied by U.S. 
government until 2005 when U.S. government lifted the banning and 
continued to normalize military training on February 2005 and weaponry 
embargo on May 2005. Therefore, U.S. support for military training and 
weaponry transfer to Densus 88 during the embargo situation in 2003 and 
2004 became the big question. 
Crisis Situation of U.S. Government 
9/11 tragedy stimulated crisis situation of U.S. government. According to 
Charles F. Hermann, a situation is classified as crisis if, and only if, it (1) 
threatens one or more important goals of a state, (2) allows only a short time 
before the situation is significantly transformed, and (3) occurs as a surprise to 
policy makers.10 Based on these three criteria, 9/11 terrorist attack had turned 
U.S. government into crisis situation. 
Firstly, the first priority for any government in the world is on its national 
security and so does for U.S. government. In “The National Security Strategy of 
the USA 2002,” President George W. Bush asserted that defending U.S. against 
its enemies was the first and fundamental commitment of his administration.11 
Thus, 9/11 attack was clearly threatening the Bush administration priority as 
well as the security of all Americans. It was by far the deadliest terrorist attack 
against the United States targeting symbols of American strength and success. 
U.S. Congress declared that the attack struck not only at the people of 
America, but also at the symbols and structures of U.S. economic and military 
strength.12 9/11 attack showed to the world that U.S. government had failed to 
accomplish its main duty to maintain the security of its citizens 
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notwithstanding only in its own mainland. In addition, it was a real message 
from the terrorists that they could fight against U.S. government and 
threatening its citizens at anytime and anywhere. 
Secondly, crisis situation is characterized by the presence of an event that 
poses a severe problem for the policymakers and possibly their constituents. 
Crisis situation is always considered by the policymakers will evolve undesired 
situation in a short time. The policymakers usually will provide a decision to 
overcome the situation as soon as possible even though data gathering about 
the situation is still at premature level. The event of 9/11 attack undoubtedly 
posed a severe problem for U.S. policymakers. It triggered mass panic turning 
into crisis situation to all Americans. After 9/11 terrorist attack, U.S. mainland 
situation became uncertain with the found of several letters containing potent 
anthrax spores which were mailed to the offices of prominent media figures 
and politicians on October 2001. Five people died of inhalation anthrax, 
apparently after being exposed to the spores.13 Though no link between 
terrorists and the anthrax mailings was found, the rash of anthrax cases 
sparked fears that terrorists were carrying out a new method using biological 
attack. U.S. policymakers paid more attention concerning national security 
issues after the fear of another terrorist attacks that would be more 
destructive. The first priority of U.S. policymakers in the aftermath of 9/11 
attacks was enhancing ability to identify potential terrorists within U.S. society 
as well as to take whatever necessary actions to stop terrorists from carrying 
out attacks as quick as possible. 
Figure 1. Crisis situation according to Charles F. Hermann’s situational cube (with modification). 
Source: Charles F. Hermann. “International Crisis as a Situational Variable.” International Politics and Foreign 
Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), 415. 
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Thirdly, 9/11 attack emerged as a great surprise to U.S. policymakers. U.S. 
government surprised with the terrorist attacks using four airplanes in New 
York and Washington. U.S. government also had no prediction that both World 
Trade Center towers could collapse into the ground after the terrorist attack. 
Moreover, 9/11 attack was considered by individual or group in the United 
States as a great surprise situation. Meanwhile U.S. government after the cold 
war era had built the new security system called Cybernetic Wireless System 
and Early Warning System and Control System,14 these security systems had 
been defeated by simple weapon such as knives used by terrorists in 9/11 
attack. Accordingly, 9/11 terrorists attack was really surprising many military 
experts and security policymakers in the United States. 
Identifying U.S. Government Behavior under Crisis Situation 
Charles A. McClelland in his article “Crisis and Threat in the International 
Setting: Some Rational Concept” noted that there are five approaches to 
analyze crisis behavior, i.e. by defining the crisis situation; classifying type of 
the crisis; studying the ends, goals, and objectives in the crisis situation; 
examining decision-making under conditions of crisis stress; and discussing 
about crisis management.15 
Based on McCleland approaches, the writer observed that 9/11 attack had 
stimulated severe problems for U.S. policymakers. It produced crisis situation 
within U.S. society. The 9/11 terrorist attack was highly threat to U.S. national 
interests and triggered fearful feeling within the society so that the 
policymakers considered that they only had a short time before the situation 
was getting worse. Most Americans considered 9/11 attack was a great 
surprise as well as the most terrible attack to U.S. mainland since the Second 
World War. As a result, the main goal of U.S. government in the aftermath of 
9/11 was protecting all Americans from another terrorist attack and making 
United States safe and secure for its own citizens. 
In a crisis situation, with its extreme danger to national goals, the highest 
level of governmental officials makes the decision. The time limitations 
together with the ability of these high-ranking decision makers to commit the 
government allow them to ignore usual bureaucratic procedures. Decision 
makers may have a tendency to rely on incomplete analogies with previous 
situations or on their prior judgments about the friendliness or hostility of the 
source of the crisis. Although some substantive disagreements may occur 
among the policymakers, personal antagonisms remain subdued because of a 
felt for ultimate consensus. Compared to the policies made in response to 
other situations, crisis decisions tend more toward under- or over-reaction.16 
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In the crisis situation after 9/11 attack, President George W. Bush as the 
highest rank of government official immediately declared that U.S. was at war 
soon after the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 at about 3:15 pm. 
President Bush met with his principal advisers through a secure video 
teleconference. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that President 
Bush began the meeting with the statement, “We’re at war.” Director of 
Central Intelligence George Tenet said the agency was still assessing who was 
responsible, but the early signs all pointed to Al Qaeda.17 Thus, it was pretty 
clear that in the aftermath of 9/11 attack, U.S. decision makers had a tendency 
to rely on incomplete analogies with previous situation on their prior 
judgments about the source of the crisis. They easily related the 9/11 attack to 
Islamist terrorist group because of some terrorist attacks in 1990s were 
believed executed by Islamist terrorist namely Al Qaeda. As a result, under 
crisis situation, President George W. Bush declared U.S. at war on terrorism 
with the main target Al Qaeda and countries that harbor its network. 
Crisis situation in the aftermath of 9/11 attack had changed U.S. 
government behavior toward its national and foreign policy. U.S. high-ranking 
decision makers not only ignored usual bureaucratic procedures but also tend 
to abuse their own policies and regulations made before the crisis situation 
occurred. They would use all efforts to win the global war on terrorism 
whereas sometimes they should ignore or abuse their own regulations or 
policies. 
According to U.S. constitution, the authority to declare the war is only in 
the hand of the Congress.18 In the case of war on terrorism, the Congress 
authorized the war on terrorism on September 18th 2001 with Joint Resolution 
22 Public Law 107-39. Nevertheless, President George W. Bush had declared 
the war on terrorism since September 11th 2001, soon after the terrorists 
attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Thus, under crisis situation, 
U.S. government behavior was highly possible ignoring or abusing its own 
regulations and any bureaucratic procedures. 
U.S. Government Support to Densus 88 as Part of its Crisis Behavior 
U.S. government was reportedly supporting the establishment of Densus 
88 upon its training and weaponry equipments under Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance (ATA) program during 2003 and 2004.19 Regarding this case, U.S. 
government was clearly abused its own foreign policy line on military training 
and weaponry transfer embargo toward the government of Indonesia. 
Practically, Indonesia should not join ATA program due to its human rights 
problem. Three Legislative Mandates on Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, 
i.e. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended), International Security and
Development Act of 1985, and Diplomatic Security Act of 1986 (as amended),
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demand countries who join the program to fulfill some prerequisites including 
human rights consideration. However, these three legislation mandates were 
ignored by U.S. government during the crisis situation in the aftermath of 9/11 
attack. 
During 2003 and 2004, Indonesia was still imposed on military training 
and weaponry embargo due to human rights violation based on Foreign 
Appropriations Act in FY 2000. On the contrary, U.S. Congress abused the spirit 
of the legislation by signing Supplemental Appropriation for Combating 
Terrorism in Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L.107-206/H.R. 4775) which demanded U.S. 
government assistance for training and equipping Indonesian police to respond 
to international terrorism, including the establishment of a special police 
counterterrorism unit Special Detachment 88. The supplemental appropriation 
underlined: 
“…the FY2002 anti-terrorism supplemental appropriations provided up to $4 
million for law enforcement training for Indonesian police forces and up to 
$12 million for training and equipping Indonesian police to respond to 
international terrorism, including the establishment of a special police 
counterterrorism unit.”
20
 
U.S. government initiated to offer ATA program to Indonesian 
government in 2002 when the Secretary of State Colin Powel Powell visiting 
Indonesia and announced the three-year of anti-terrorism assistance package 
from U.S. government to Indonesian government in amount of 50 million US 
dollars. Furthermore, Bali bombings tragedy in October 12th 2002 had 
convinced U.S. government to realize its offer as soon as possible. The 
Secretary of State Colin Powell said at a news conference after Bali bombings 
that Indonesian government could not pretend terrorism did not exist in the 
country. He hoped the attack reinforced Indonesia's determination to deal 
with terrorism threat. 
Indonesian government pathway to join ATA program was wider after Bali 
bombings tragedy. U.S. government ignored Indonesian government record on 
human rights violations as well as its military training and weaponry embargo 
on Indonesia. Kurt Campbell, a former Pentagon adviser, said that the Bali 
bombings provide the important meaning that the tragedy was the first and 
most powerful recognition that the battle against terrorism was not strictly 
limited to the Middle East or south Asia. He stated that national security 
concerns would override human rights worries in the short term.21 
U.S. government remained supporting Indonesian government on the war 
against terrorism through ATA program until the establishment of Densus 88 in 
2004. Though U.S. government had clearly abused its own law and foreign 
policy line on military training and weaponry embargo to Indonesian 
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government, the crisis situation made it possible. The writer illustrates the 
situation under following figure. 
Crisis situation (highest 
national priority being 
threatened, the need of a 
quick decision, terrorist 
attacks are surprising 
policymakers) 
Normal situation (highest 
national priority under 
secure situation, have 
enough time to set up a 
decision, no event that is 
surprising policymakers)  
Support Delta 88 
regardless the existence 
of military training and 
weaponry embargo 
High possible Less possible 
Doesn’t support Delta 
88 because of military 
training and weaponry 
embargo 
Less possible High possible 
Figure 2. Decision matrix of U.S. government support to Densus 88 (developed based on Sven Ove Hansson’s 
decision matrix in Sven Ove Hansson. Decision Theory: Brief Introduction (Stockholm: Department of 
Philosophy and the History of Technology Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), 2005), 25-26). 
The writer observed other phenomena concerning crisis behavior of U.S. 
government. In the situation before 9/11 attack, U.S. government imposed 
foreign assistance restrictions upon India and Pakistan due to their nuclear 
tests in 1998 and the Kargil conflict between these two newest nuclear states 
in 1999. However, 9/11 tragedy had changed U.S. position on it. After 9/11 
tragedy, the government of India responded U.S. declaration on the global war 
against terrorism with “full support” while the government of Pakistan showed 
“indispensable help.” The first priority of the United States after 9/11 attack 
was to win the war on terrorism and therefore President Bush rapidly waived 
sanctions and provided assistance to India and Pakistan. Moreover, on 
September 22nd 2001, Bush issued a final determination removing all 
remaining nuclear test-related economic sanctions against Pakistan and India. 
On October 27th 2001, President Bush signed S.146 (P.L. 107-57) into law, 
officially waiving sanctions on Pakistan related to democracy and debt 
arrearage through 2003. In addition, the removal of sanctions allowed the 
United States to extend to 600 million dollars in Economic Support Funds (ESF) 
to Islamabad. In 2002, Pakistan received an estimated $624.5 million in 
development assistance and ESF, while India received $164.3 million in 
development aid, ESF and food aid grants.22 Thus, it is pretty clear that under 
crisis situation, U.S. government is highly possible ignoring or abusing its own 
foreign policy line. Based on data examined, the writer concludes that the 
more crisis situation confronted by U.S. government, the more possible U.S. 
government abuses its own regulations and foreign policy line. 
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